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ABSTRACT: Macroeconomic models are facing a crisis and their foundations
need to be rethought. This report describes an agent based simulation model,
which using the concepts and methods more familiar in micro economy,
produces initial results that qualitatively correspond with several macroe-
conomic phenomena. These include robust growth and equilibrium char-
acteristics, economic cycles, emergent money and complex supply chains.
The model relies on private values and networked barter. Learning happens
through rational negotiation and exchange of experiences, not through imi-
tation.
KEYWORDS: Agent based social simulation, economic theory, value forma-
tion, emergence in economic models, emergent money in networked barter,
Post Walrasian general equilibrium
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1 INTRODUCTION
Models and measurements are the core of science. Most of the existing
models in science are linear and their predictions can more or less easily be
compared with measurements. When we encounter nonlinear phenomena,
stochastic methods have commonly been used, but often their explanatory
power is quite low and they do not give insight to detailed causal relations [1].
New methods need to be devised for complex systems when detailed models
are important. Agent based simulation has often proven useful when studying
nonlinear systems, or in other words, complex behavior. Agent based simula-
tion models, which correspond well enough with physical reality and consist
of credible component behaviors, can be considered scientifically valid [2].
Simulation is also useful as a tool, when the situations of interest cannot
easily be recreated for measurement purposes in physical reality. Due to this
reason, human behavior and especially organizational behavior are more and
more often studied and modeled through the use of social simulations.
One area where great interest and great difficulty coincide is economic be-
havior. Current economic models are based on money both as the medium
of exchange and as the measurement of value. Walrasian general equilibrium
model is the main paradigm through which the various market phenomena
are explained, the so called Law of Supply and Demand. This paradigm
is facing increasing difficulties and solutions are being searched [3]. The
impact of the so called network economy contains considerable amount of
exchange and collaboration that is not easily converted to monetary terms.
In networks, participants rarely share same information and social ties af-
fect competition. Human behavior is diverting from the Homo Economi-
cus model in many ways that are not easily handled through the existing
paradigm [4][5].
Other principles such as Pareto efficiency have been questioned likewise.
In the case of imperfect information, Pareto optimum is not reached [6]. Also
it has been noticed that increases in production when calculated in terms of
money do not necessarily increase the wellbeing of people. In addition to
these problems, innovations have no natural place in equilibrium theories.
There is no existing theory that even attempts to solve all these problems
consistently.
This sums up the background of this work, which was started in 2001 and
then described in some more detail in a seminar paper in 2004 in the context
of organization theory and business strategy [7]. Due to other interests the
work was not continued until 2008 when the author programmed the simu-
lation and presented it to small audiences. Theoretical work has continued
in 2010 and this is a technical paper describing the content and reasoning
behind the 2008 simulation and some of its preliminary results.
A comprehensive literature review or comparison to existing theories is not
included in this report. Many of the assumptions of the presented simulation
model are grounded in well accepted theory but all references are not fully
included in this paper and some others are at present based on intuition and
require either founding on prior research or testing on different options. Due
to the extensive realm of the simulation and its implications; this much larger
body of work is mostly yet to be done.
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It can be mentioned here however that no similar simulation is known to
exist. The closest one that is found is briefly described later. It bears resem-
blance only in some parts. As complex simulations go, they cannot be divided
in parts if their interaction gives rise to emergence. It is the whole sequence
of events you need to simulate to gain insight in the emergent phenomena.
Thus it is believed that this work contains important original contributions
that can already be appreciated in spite of an apparent need for further clari-
fication and background research.
2 BASIC PRINCIPLES
When we attempt to model economy that includes competition and innova-
tion and social networks, we need to start from the foundations. Selection of
the agents, and their parameters and allowed actions is crucial. The proposed
model aims simultaneously at parsimony and wide explanatory power. Basic
assumptions are generally described in this introduction. Further details are
given in each following chapter before results and implementation issues are
described.
In theory, all exchanges can be considered as barter. Each agent sees
some private value for utilities and any medium used specially for exchange
purposes can emerge from utilities used in barter, thus there is no need for
a separate concept of money. No consideration is given to synchronicity or
bookkeeping of barter except to notice that all bookkeeping is private and
based on private expectations and values. Any labor required for bookkeeping
or barter is considered as part of the efficiency of exchange that is included
in the model. Assumptions are based on Transaction Cost Economy [8].
Individuals are selected as agents. When we consider social networks and
their effects on economy, we must see that individuals both make decisions,
have needs and social relations. There has been criticism against many mod-
els of social networks that use the concept of trust between firms [9]. The
concept of firms or clans as groupings of individual agents is planned for but
not yet implemented in the current simulation. In the plan, it is considered
an attribute of an agent and it lowers transaction costs between members of
the hierarchy or adhocracy depending on the type of firm. In the realm of
Organization Theory, firm is either considered as an agreement between in-
dividuals to further their own agenda (Institutional Theories) or a grouping
of people to work more efficiently in collaboration (Knowledge Based View).
Both phenomena are emergent in this model through network clustering
and further study is required to see if there is need for additional concepts
to support emergence of economic organizations and especially those where
decisions are hierarchically made.
Social networks and their implications to firms and economy have at-
tracted growing interest [10]. Social networks are formed between individ-
uals, and they also handle all economic transactions and make all decisions
in practice. Individuals only know a limited number of other people well
enough to initiate and do business with them in such a manner that can
be said to lower transaction cost compared to any random transaction. A
maximum of circa 150 well known acquaintances is commonly referred to
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in psychology. At present, all agents have similar sized social networks. The
networks are directed and an agent may belong to some other agent’s network
without the other agent belonging to his network. The network of acquainted
agents is not static. New candidates to a network are searched randomly. In
the future, this should be an area of further study. Scale free networks may
have important implications to exchange, but in most cases it is not social
ties but products that are widely known and that effect is already supported
through capability to retail any product.
In the proposed model there is no concept of distance between agents,
but each dyadic transaction becomes easier when repeated. This includes all
learning and development in logistic procedures. Considering both history
and contemporary ages, it can well be seen that individuals both produce and
sell their services and products and firms have only a partial role in the ex-
change. Thus models that concentrate on firms and consumers and workers
cannot penetrate very deeply into the phenomena of exchange.
We assume that human beings have rather similar needs to one another.
Some of these needs require more effort and some less effort to fulfill. As
we talk about fulfilling needs, we should understand that most of the needs
can be fulfilled in various ways that are not directly comparable as products
or services. We talk generally about utilityi for fulfilling the corresponding
needi. As any modeled utilityi can be implemented through various prod-
ucts or services, there is no direct comparison of prices as such, but an agent
satisfies his needs as he best sees fit and we do not differentiate the products
in any way except classifying them as utilitiesi for fulfilling needi. This as-
sumption is very realistic but it also causes problems for practical calculations
in the real economy. As this paper describes a theoretical model, no attempt
is done to analyze what these needs might be in practice. The needs are not
fixed in their volume even though they are considered to have a minimum
required level. Price elasticity of demand is included in the model and ac-
tually without price elasticity, economic growth may be difficult to model in
any realistic way. Price elasticity of demand in the proposed model can be
interpreted in many ways, either we consume more of some utility that satis-
fies our need or satisfy our need of that utility with some product or service
of higher quality than before or in a more wasteful way.
As a metaphor of the starting point of the simulation, we select the gen-
eral lifestyle of hunter gatherers, where each adult individual can support her
own needs without any need for barter. Initially each agent is able to pro-
vide for her own needs and has a small stock of everything. Each agent has
a small and random inborn capability for slightly increased efficiency in ful-
filling some of the needs. This corresponds to human beings inborn traits or
educational differences. After fulfilling one’s own needs, an agent may use
the excess time to producing excess for own stock or for bartering purposes.
When two agents are acquainted, they compare their options and barter
if both see gain from the exchange through each agent’s private value sys-
tems. Continued production over one’s own need leads to specialization.
Adam Smith says in his Wealth of Nations: “The greatest improvement in
the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity,
and judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have
been the effects of the division of labour.” When an agent produces some
2 BASIC PRINCIPLES 9
utility above his own requirements, his efficiency in that kind of production
is increased. Both productions related learning and innovation are included
and not separated from each other.
The private value system is based on the effort of fulfilling each need.
Adam Smith was quite clear: “Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its
own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all
commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is
their real price; money is their nominal price only.” Adam Smith saw money
as a convenient way of comparing prices and exchange values, but noticed
that the real price varies from person to person, place to place and time to
time even though the nominal price would be the same [11]. Thus it is
reasonable for us to talk about the price or value of money itself, and that is
one of the results of this study.
Max Weber writes: “Substantive rationality cannot be measured in terms
of formal calculation alone, but also involves a relation to absolute values or
to the content of the particular given ends to which it is oriented. [...] A
system of accounting in kind would have to set up indices of the value of
various significant resources which would play the role of accounting prices
of modern business. [...] In principle, as an observable fact, a monetary unit
has a substantive value only in relation to particular kinds of goods and only
for each separate individual as his own valuation on the basis of marginal
utility of money for him, which will vary with his income.” [12] Although
Max Weber considered calculations in kind to be impractical, this simula-
tion model is based on those and calculations are done separately for each
individual. And whatever money (media of exchange) there is, it is not de-
fined separately but it is emergent, thus having private value for each agent
similarly to other utilities, and like metal money in historical ages, exchange
media can be produced by any agent.
It is clear that any realistic simulation of economy needs to take into ac-
count the two different ways of economic decisions Max Weber pointed out.
When one satisfies one’s own needs, or when one invests in utilities for max-
imizing profit in exchange, the heuristics differ. If we expect to profit from
exchange, this is taken into account in stock limits and private values that
affect production and exchange behavior. Also it must be noted that when
you gain profit from barter and use the newly acquired utility as a payment
for another exchange, you may see the value very differently from what la-
bor it would require if you produced it yourself. Thus an agent may end up
paying more for some utilities than his own production cost, if his available
production time pays better when used elsewhere.
There is ample proof that we have an inborn trait for fairness [13]. Studies
show that an agreement often fails if profit is not equally divided between
parties, thus 50/50 deals should be typical. In each exchange, the mutual
gain in private values is calculated and such “negotiated” exchange rate is se-
lected that yields highest mutual gain that is then divided for both according
to their private valuations. All potential trading partners are evaluated be-
fore committing to an exchange, and the most profitable ones are selected.
Successful and unsuccessful transactions affect an agent’s private values. It
is assumed that a realistic randomized process would not lead to any con-
siderable difference in results compared to this approach, which is faster to
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simulate, where realistic averages are used.
No exchange is practical without agents producing surplus and carrying
stock or corresponding investment in production capacity. Surplus utilities
are produced for one’s own future needs or to be used in exchange for other
utilities. Useful stock size is estimated based on the agent’s own basic need,
elasticity of demand accounted for. If an agent has recent experience that
a utility is useful in exchange, this increases stock limit. Stock value is op-
timized through exchange with networked friends if an agent has enough
surpluses to experience leisure time and can consider other issues besides
just satisfying one’s own basic needs. Through these features, the agents can
act in all common roles of a supply chain.
As an agent bases his private values and stock sizes on expected usefulness,
these values are updated continuously when supply or demand changes. It is
clear that increase in demand will generally lead to larger potential stock and
profit in exchange value will increase valuation. Naturally when demand falls
lower, maximum stock is lowered and if the situation continues, overflow of
stock will lead to decrease in value and later to slow spoiling of stock. Thus
an agent learns values through actual own experience and does not directly
copy or imitate values from other agent’s private value systems. This allows
agents to operate in different points of the value chain and different network
environments. Producer’s own private values for utilities are very different
from those of consumers.
As agents expect to profit from exchanges, they need to have separate
threshold values when giving or receiving each utility. All profit calcula-
tions are based on these values and the unit of value is based on time, but it
should be understood that the connection to actual production time is mod-
ified strongly through experiences in exchange.
Unlike many other economic models, this proposed model does not even
aim to result in Pareto efficiency even though the model, through each
agent’s selfish pursuit does lead to well behaved economic growth. It is un-
derstood that the exchanges have a positive sum, but due to lacking informa-
tion, they may still have negative effect to one of the parties. It is also that
in the absence of perfect information or complete markets, outcomes will
generically be Pareto inefficient (the Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem).
2.1 Important prior work in agent based simulation models
There are many important simulations but macroeconomic agent basedmod-
els have only been developed very recently. Only the most extensive of these
models is mentioned here.
Herbert Gintis is a well known critic of the Walrasian general equilibrium
theory. In “The Dynamics of General Equilibrium”, he claims to present the
first general, highly decentralised, agent-based model of the dynamics of gen-
eral equilibrium [14]. His model includes firms as producers and individuals
as workers and consumers, the concept of money and exchange using private
values. Firms receive financing and consumers have individual utility func-
tions. Gintis has done a thorough literature review and concludes his model
to be the most extensive one. He points out further work i.e. saying his model
lacks inter-industry trade and retail, has very simple asset heterogeneity, no
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structure to the firms, and no costs associated to the transactions [14].
In spite of evident similarities, the model described in this paper differs
greatly from that of Herbert Gintis. Firms are emergent through network
clustering, utility functions are basically similar from agent to agent, and
separate markets exist only through agents different networks. Production
and work is not separated conceptually. What money there is, is also emer-
gent. Wholesale trading and retail is supported and individuals specialize
and change their specialties if demand for their products weakens. Learning
happens through negotiation process, but direct imitation only takes place in
consumption patterns.
The proposedmodel in this paper has not yet been analyzed nearly as thor-
oughly for equilibrium characteristics as that of Herbert Gintis. A thorough
comparison of the results should be done in those areas where the results can
be compared to each other. However it must be said that private values of util-
ities are not easily comparable when it is as easy to talk about the private value
of money as of the value of any other utility. When the supply chain grows
longer through increasing specialization, the purchase value of some specific
utility for the producer or wholesaler is quite different from the purchase
value of the same utility for the consumer. The most meaningful measure-
ments are those of average production and utility levels, average deviation
from the utility level, transaction costs and the general production and ex-
change levels of common and rare utilities in the simulation. It is clear from
the results that some similarities exist and several notable new phenomena
can be seen that have good general correspondence to both microeconomics
and macroeconomics.
3 OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE SIMULATION MODEL
The most important concepts are agent, network, need, utility, production,
stock, exchange, transparency, timeslot, leisure time, purchase price and sales
price. An overview to each is given here briefly before entering the more
detailed description of the simulation algorithm.
• An agent represents an individual person, who has needs and capabili-
ties to produce and stock utilities and exchange them with other agents
in his network.
• A network is the list of an agent’s acquaintances. Each agent can have
a limited number of other agents in his network. An agent can initi-
ate exchange only with acquaintances. A passive acquaintance can be
replaced by another agent.
• A need describes how many corresponding utilities an agent requires
in each simulation cycle to be satisfied. There are n different needs
and correspondingly n different utilities. The needs are not equal in
size.
• A utility satisfies a need. Utilities can be produced or gained through
exchange.
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• Any individual can produce any utility for satisfying their own need.
An agent talented in some utility can produce that utility for stock. If
an agent produces some utility in higher volume than their own need,
their experience grows and they are able to produce the utility more
efficiently.
• Stock is where an agent stores any unused surplus of a utility. Stock
can be used to satisfy a need or used in exchange with another agent
for another utility. Stock size is limited to an agents expected near term
usage.
• Exchange is useful when an agent has surplus of some utility in stock
and another agent in his network has some other utility in stock and
each agent values more that, which the other agent has. All exchange
options are evaluated each cycle.
• Transparency from an agent to receiving some utility from another
agent in exchange determines transaction cost. Transaction cost wastes
part of the received utility. Transparency is increased through experi-
ence.
• Timeslot is how long it takes initially to produce one utility of any
kind. An agent has enough timeslots to produce all utilities required to
satisfy their all needs. When efficiency grows, timeslots cannot be all
used and this is considered leisure time.
• Leisure time is a sign of wealth and needs increase.
• Purchase price is a private value an agent has for a utility. It shows how
valuable a utility we are at maximum willing to hand out in exchange
for this utility. Initially purchase price is 1. When deciding what to pro-
duce, own production of initial efficiency 1 is comparable to purchase
price 1. Thus price units may be interpreted to equal timeslots.
• Sales price is a private value an agent has for a utility. It shows how
valuable a utility we at minimum require to give out this utility. In
exchange situations, only each agent’s private sales price / purchase
price -ratios affect the negotiation.
If we consider the simulation model from the viewpoint of game theory,
the simulated game is Bayesian as each agent has only imperfect information
on the situation. Agents have knowledge only from their own network, which
gains new members in a random manner. From their network, each agent
only gets partial information from private values and availability of products
for exchange.
Each dyadic exchange is calculated using an average transaction cost. In
principle dyadic exchanges would be better implemented as Bayesian too,
but due to efficiency reasons, success of each transaction is averaged to a
deterministic loss that depends on several factors whose sum can be calcu-
lated ex ante. Reliance on the averages leads to faster learning but besides
the resulting effect leading to greater stability; it should not affect other equi-
librium characteristics. Using random results in transactions would slow the
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simulation down possibly several orders of magnitude and make the whole
simulation practically impossible. The randomness in talents and networks
is considered to provide enough variability to the initial situation.
The simulation is run in stepwise cycles. To avoid favoring any agent,
each agent is evaluated fully in each cycle. The evaluation order mostly has
a satisfactory resemblance to intuitive order of things. Some other realistic
options for ordering the phases may exist, but this order is selected for ef-
ficiency reasons and as the process is cyclical, difference in results if other
realistic options were used is believed to be small. Other options should be
considered and results compared to ensure robustness however.
Each agent, each cycle:
1. The needs and timeslot counter are reinstated.
2. Each needi is satisfied from previous surplus stocki if such exists.
3. For remaining needs, each needi is considered separately and all net-
worked friends are checked for surplus and exchange possibility. The
cheapest source for each remaining needi is selected and exchange
committed if considered profitable. Heuristics for friendship acquisi-
tion, private value system and profit calculation are explained later.
4. For remaining needs, each still unsatisfied needi is satisfied by produc-
ing corresponding utilityi while available timeslots are reduced corre-
spondingly.
5. Remaining timeslots are utilized for producing excess to stock. Heuris-
tics for selecting the most suitable utilityi for production is explained
later. There is a possibility that not all timeslots can be used as heuris-
tics limits the size of stocki that is considered useful.
6. If leisure time exists, all needs are temporarily increased in proportion
to the amount of leisure time available and price elasticity is taken into
account. Steps 2-5 are repeated and each surplusi is checked if it
could be exchanged for profit with any networked friendk. The most
profitable exchange opportunities are selected. Heuristics is described
later.
7. Private values, relationships and experience are updated to reflect new
transactions.
3.1 Parameters of each agent
There are n individual agents, test data is produced with n = 3, 000.
Each individual agentk hasm different needs and m corresponding capa-
bilities to produce utilities to satisfy the corresponding needs. The total num-
ber of needs for each individual agent ism, thus each agent has all needs. At
present simulationsm is set at 30.
For each agentk the production of utilityj to satisfy needj in the example
runs requires j2 timeslots per each cycle without any gain in experiencej.
Thus i.e. the individual need1 requires 1 production units of utility1 and
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the need30 requires 900 production units of utility30 during each cycle. This
means that needs are ordered by the default number of timeslots required
to satisfy them. All basic needs are considered of equal importance so that
each needi must be satisfied. Basically then, this is a question of grouping
the needs based on the effort required to satisfy them and is suggested to be
mainly a definition and not an assumption. The reason for having the group
sizes different is to increase realism and to let us see if utilities that allow for
great specialization behave differently from utilities that require a large share
of effort to produce.
Production experiencei to satisfy a needi is initially set at 1 for all needs.
Each individual agent is then given random needs-related talents. Number
of talents is 50% of all needs in test simulation. For each talenti, production
experiencei, for needi is increased modestly, 50% in test simulation. Each
individual produces one production uniti per one timeslot multiplied by pro-
duction experiencei. Each individual has timeslots enough to provide for all
his needs with no experience. Thus each talenti provides for potential small
initial surplusi. This assumption is very realistic.
3.2 Social network of the agents and dyadic parameters
During each cycle, each agent evaluates their friendship network. Contacts
are ordered by recent transaction activity and new contacts replace most pas-
sive contacts with smallest weighed index of transactions. Index is calculated
by reducing the index each round by a fixed percentage. Thus oldest trans-
actions have least weigh. A new contact is selected randomly. When an ex-
change is initiated from another agent, this agent is automatically evaluated
as a potential friend. However friendship networks are basically one sided
and each agent evaluates independently who remains in their network. Each
dyadic friendship relation includes information on the frequency of transac-
tions, but also information on what kinds of transactions have taken place.
This information is used to determine potential efficiency of each particu-
lar kind of transaction between the two agents. Test data is produced with a
maximum network of 100 other agents for each agentk.
3.3 Parameters of consumption
Initially the size of each needi = i2. Each need can be satisfied either from
stock, through exchange or by producing it. There are enough timeslots to
satisfy all needs without any stock or exchange. As specialization increases
production experience, the surplus production is stored for future needs or
exchange. There are limits to what an agenti sees practical to produce and
thus it is possible to end up with unused timeslots.
If all timeslots cannot be used, it is read as a sign of high income and
all needs are increased by multiplying them first with needsincrement =
maxtime/(maxtime − timeremaining). The change in needsincrement
is then limited in each cycle to better correspond with general human be-
havior of some slowness in changing routines. This increase in needs corre-
sponds to the fact that people with higher income tend to satisfy their needs
with more utilities or higher quality utilities. The increase in needs is not
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linear but after basic needs are fulfilled, the added needs are modified with
taking price elasticity into account. Those needs are increase more where
production cost is lower than average and the other needs are reduced cor-
respondingly. As excess demand is shown to be culturally modified, price
elasticity is calculated based on average production cost and not on private
values. Thus the price elasticity may contain imitation and marketing effects,
but none of these are assumed.
It should also be noted again that the needs and corresponding utilities
described here do not correspond to particular products or services directly.
3.4 Parameters of production
Initially the production of any single utility item requires one timeslot. If
an agent is experienced in producing a particular utilityi, he uses less time
for that production. In example simulation, the talenti raises efficiency ini-
tially by 50%. Talents are random. In test simulation each agent is gifted in
c. 20% probability in producing each particular utilityi. This probability is
not expected to affect the results in any considerable way unless extremely
low or high probabilities are used. Surplus production to stocki is only per-
formed at present where the agentk has talenti. Efficiency is increased also
through experiencei in production and if it surpasses the effect of talenti,
only experiencei has an effect.
Stocki is also used to store utilities received in exchange if they are not
directly consumed to satisfy needs. Maximum stocki for each utilityi is
calculated separately, and each agent has private estimate on how much it
is practical to store each utilityi. This estimate is based on how much an
agentk needs the utilityi for consumption and how much has been handed
out in exchange for other utilities or sold in other words.
Recent productioni is calculated by adding current cycle production to
discounted previous recent productioni. Recent sales and purchases that an
agent gives and receives in exchange are calculated in a similar way.
Maximum stocki of any utilityi is calculated as a sum of recent salesi
and basic consumptioni of a few cycles of the utilityi, elasticity of demand
taken into account. Both timeframes are arbitrary parameters that are not
believed to have any considerable qualitative effect on the results. If sales go
down, maximum stocki limit may be exceeded and excess stocki is partially
spoiled in each cycle.
Product experiencei is calculated as square root of agent’s recent produc-
tion per the sum of needs during the same time. Thus if the agent produces
for himself only, efficiency is one, but if an agent produces four times his
own need, efficiency is doubled. Time consumed for each productioni satis-
fying remaining needi is calculated as needi/experiencei. This formula for
adding efficiency is arbitrary. As long as efficiency can be multiplied through
experience, the specific formula is not expected to change the results in qual-
itative sense, and initial tests seem to confirm this but no extensive tests are
done. Each utilityi for surplus productioni is selected from those that have
room in stocki and to whose production the agent has talenti. The highest
available production indexi is selected and the corresponding utilityi is pro-
duced until timeslots are out or stocki is full. Production indexi is calculated
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based on efficiencyi and realized private sales pricei. It is clear that both
should be considered. Efficiency takes into account what we are used to do
and will do when we follow routines. High sales pricei is a clear motive, too.
Sales volume is already taken into account in the size of stock. Several pos-
sible heuristics exist that should be studied further. The most intuitive have
been selected for current simulation.
3.5 Parameters and heuristics for barter
For each agentk, each unsatisfied needi or any utilityi that can be fitted in
stocki, each friendl who has a surplusi of that particular utilityi is checked.
For each proposing agentk, exchange profit is calculated for each possible
exchange where agentk has surplusj and friendl has no surplusj or room
for more stockj . Calculation is based on private value ratios of both parties.
The most favorable exchange is selected to satisfy each need.
Exchangeindex(ki<>lj) should be positive in order for the exchange to
have a sum positive value and it is calculated from private values as follows:
friendl purchase pricek of proposed gift per friendl sales pricej of required
utilityj times inefficiency of transaction minus agentk sales pricei of the gift
per agentk purchase pricej of the utilityj . In other words, the private value
of what both get in exchange (multiplied with each other) should be greater
than what they both give (multiplied with each other) transaction inefficiency
included. It should be noted here that we do not assume that both parties of
the exchange will actually win, but we assume only that the expected sum
result of the exchange is positive. This generally seems to hold true for almost
all trade including regulated trade.
Transaction cost is taken into account as transaction efficiency factor indi-
cating transparency and it is calculated for all dyadic and market transactions
based on agents experience and dyadic history. Transparency is directed and
it is always calculated from the receiving direction and lacking transparency
is calculated as waste and decreases the yield of utilityi at the receiving end
without affecting the source.
When the highest exchange index is found and exchange is committed,
the maximum number of utilities is exchanged limited by agents need or
stock limit and maximum stock limit of the friend and availability of the util-
ity in friends stock. Both see different exchange ratio based on their private
values of what they get and give. Exchange ratio is calculated as the aver-
age of the differing opinions and can be considered as the most probable
result. Thus exchange ratio is friends purchase price of proposed gift per
friend’s sales price of required utility times inefficiency of transaction plus
agents sales price of the gift per agent’s purchase price of the utility times
inefficiency of transaction per two.
3.6 Value formation, sales and purchase price thresholds
When each agentk ends their cycle, for each utilityj both an expected min-
imum sales pricej and expected maximum purchase pricej are calculated.
Production cost of each utilityj is 1/efficiencyj and basically this shows
how much time is used to produce one utility. Unit of calculation for the
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private threshold values, minimum sales price and maximum purchase price
are also based on time used and are initially same as production cost and are
changed according to the following somewhat intuitive rules:
For maximum purchase price of each utilityi we have three different sit-
uations:
1. When stock of the utilityi is small or none, maximum purchase pricei
may be increased unless higher than both production costi and min-
imum sales pricei. Purchase pricei may exceed production costi if
recent salesi exceed recent productioni.
2. When stock of the utilityi is on the normal level, maximum purchase
pricei is checked. It should not be above minimum sales pricei, and if
sales are small, it should not be higher than production costi and not
too much smaller either if there is production going on.
3. When there is a large stocki of the utilityi, we lower the maximum
purchase pricei and check that it is below production costi if salesi
are small.
For minimum sales pricei we have similarly three situations:
1. When stock of the utilityi is small or none and salesi have been high,
we raise minimum sales pricei to average recent sales pricei. If sales
pricei is below both production costi and purchase pricei, we raise it
to the level of purchase pricei if purchase volumei is considerable and
otherwise to production costi.
2. When stock of the utilityi is on the normal level and salesi are low,
we set minimum sales pricei to production costi.
3. When there is a large stock of the utilityi we discount. If there have
been no salesi, we go directly to production costi and discount further
if the situation remains.
There have been some experiments on these rules and any changes that
have affected end results considerably have been very unrealistic. Extensive
testing has not been done.
3.7 Transaction inefficiencies and waste
There are two kinds of wastei. When an agentk has too large stocki, the
excess stocki spoils partially on each cycle. The stocki may become too large
when expected sales volumei is not realized and maximum stock limiti is
reduced below the actual stocki size. This event is very realistic and happens
to most utilities through physical spoiling or when utilities get out of fashion
The other kind of wastei is linked to exchange situations. All kinds of
search costs, mistakes, negotiation costs, lacking specific assets and various
other transaction costs are represented by lack of transparency. Transparency
is measured as a directed parameter separately from each agent to every friend
and for all utilities received in exchange. When agentk gives utilityi to
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agentl and receives utilityj as payment, transparency of agentk to agentl for
utilityj is used for calculating waste of utilityj in the exchange and trans-
parency of agentl to agentk for utilityi is used to calculate waste of utilityi
in the same exchange. This waste is removed in the exchange and thus is
given but not received.
Transparency from agenti to agentl for receiving utilityi is increased
through all recent transactions between agentk and agentl, agentk being
talented and experienced in utilityi and agentk having received utilityi pre-
viously from agentl. Initial testing seems to show that the emphasis of these
effects can vary considerably without affecting the quality of the end results in
any major way. But simultaneously it should be mentioned that these learn-
ing based efficiencies help in creating stabile structures that help in adding
to income differences. The effects should be tested further.
Through this concept of waste it is meaningful to talk separately of in-
crease in production and increase in consumption or satisfying the needs.
4 INITIAL RESULTS
All the agents satisfy initially all their needs with their own production. Some
surplus is produced due to giftedness. As friendship networks are formed
and exchange possibilities are studied, some exchange takes place between
friends, but mostly to satisfy both exchanging parties own needs. Transaction
costs and stock spoils remain low. In the earliest phases largest efficiency
gain and most utilities being exchanged are those with largest need. This
resembles early markets full of commodities.
As all agents are gifted in producing several different utilities, some agents
shift their preferred production to more rare utilities when their friendship
network grows and the number of utilities being exchanged grows. Produc-
tion efficiency slowly increases in smaller volume utilities and they start to
be traded. The further the simulation goes, the more rare products enter the
exchange. Simultaneously with specialization, also supply chains grow and
production efficiency grows faster in the rare end of utilities.
In the later stages, very few, depending on the number of needs and
agents, possibly even one producer dominates the whole market for each
of the rarest utilities but the utilities pass through several wholesalers and
distributors before being consumed. In the supply chain, there exists some
instability as agents grow their stock when they see growing demand. This
causes fluctuations, and sometimes even boom bust cycles in the production
of some utilities.
Price elasticity starts to affect development when most needs are satisfied
through exchange and production efficiency has risen high enough. Price
elasticity affects rarest utilities more than others as specialization in highest
there and thus also production efficiency. The end result is rather realis-
tic, consumption of luxury or convenience items grow fastest when people
become wealthy.
From detailed study of the events in the simulation one sees a multitude of
lifelike phenomena whose statistics is presently unavailable due to the limita-
tions of the simulation software. As private values change, agents end up with
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Figure 1: Production growth is initially fast as direct friends utilize their ex-
change possibilities. Transaction cost grows then considerably in spite of
increasing transparency in dyadic transactions. This is due to lengthening
of supply chains and increasing use of exchange media. Overall complex-
ity of exchange grows. Economic cycles are clear. Both production volume
and transaction costs are measured in total number of produced units per
total usable timeslots. It must be remembered that results vary greatly across
utilities.
Figure 2: In the rarest product, maximum produced number of that util-
ity per corresponding average need shows that the largest producer supplies
more than the total need for the whole agent population and has practically
monopolized the market. Due to possible competition and fluctuation of
stock sizes the production volume experiences constant change. Excess pro-
duction is consumed to transaction costs and waste in the supply chain. This
is expected as the rarest product is often used as exchange media.
the need to devaluate stock, causing trouble for agents that have made mis-
taken assumptions and sometimes causing crisis for the whole supply chain
and often also spoiling of stock. This also causes unemployment like behav-
ior and the need for agents to fall back to producing for their own needs in
spite of inefficiency, and the attempts to better the situation by specializing
to new production lines. These fluctuations seem to happen often for the
rarest one or two utilities that are generally stocked in later phases and used
for exchange in numbers that greatly exceed their consumption. The rarest
utilities seem to fulfill the criteria of exchange media and can be thought of
as rare metal based free money. Fluctuations in these utilities seem to have
several resemblances in the simulation model to economic cycles.
After several hundred cycles the total production growth has slowed down
and the system can be considered to reach equilibrium. In the test run the
simulation is continued for 2000 rounds to show that cyclical behavior is a
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Figure 3: The total production in units of the rarest utility per population
size. These figures do not correct for price elasticity or needs increase but
show the absolute production figures.
Figure 4: When oligopoly or monopoly situation is reached, private purchase
price of money remains generally very high compared to the average produc-
tion cost. The average deviation of purchase price of utility 1 is also very high
due to long supply chain.
property of the equilibrium. It is clear from prior experiments that a higher
number of needs and agents, faster growth would continue longer. After this
phase, structures get more rigid, producers of rare utilities are relatively safe
from competition due to learning curve of production and their customer
network.
5 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
The software is written in C-language using integer math in most algorithms.
The implementation method was selected as the algorithm is rather time
consuming even when all variables are stored in ram memory. The program
size is c. 1300 lines of including debug and data collection code. Due to
using integer math, many numbers are ten folded and small deviations are
rounded off. Some algorithmic decisions are made on efficiency reasons
where the decisions are not considered to affect the results. As the database
evolves almost completely on each cycle and is several gigabytes in size, all
history data needs to be condensed and saved separately for later analysis.
Currently the simulation displays both consolidated data and selected test
agents behavior each cycle. Hundreds of hours has been spent studying be-
havior and decision making of the agents. On a regular PC, test run takes
few hours for 3000 agents, each with a network of X friends and Y needs.
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Figure 5: Average utility level measures in howmany multiples the needs can
be satisfied by agents during each cycle. Like total production, this measure-
ment of “living standard” displays clear economic cycles. Spoiled utilities
would be high if measured in unit numbers but in this figure they are con-
verted to time units, and spoils represent less than 10% of the total time spent
in production.
6 SUMMARY
This report has pointed out some of the grave weaknesses our existingmacroe-
conomic paradigm contains. New paradigm needs to be sought out that in-
cludes dynamic properties in complex environment. Agent based simula-
tions are the proposed answer. As our economy consists of individual human
beings, who often freely select whether they work for someone else to ob-
tain media for exchange and then buy what they need or directly provide for
themselves, and as many schools of thought model firms as contracts between
people, the fundamentals of economy should be based on exchange between
individuals and not on exchange between individuals and firms. As social ties
are important, this exchange should take social ties into account. We have
also shown that money does not have same value for everyone and individ-
uals have a high number of activities outside monetary economy. Thus a
foundation should be sought where private values are not based on money,
and income can be calculated in kind.
The proposed model includes individuals as agents. They are able to pro-
vide for their own basic needs. If they specialize, they become more produc-
tive. They also form social ties, and barter with other agents using their own
private values as the base for negotiations. The most optimal exchange op-
tions are used. Transaction costs are reduced when experience grows and pri-
vate values reflect only each agents own experience from negotiations within
the agents own social network. Stock accumulates through production and
barter. Stock size is limited to near term usage in consumption and exchange
and is taken into account when evaluating private values. Price elasticity is
taken into account.
Test runs show robustly that the modeled economy grows and reaches a
high level and starts to produce economic cycles. Total utility can be cal-
culated separately from gross production. Value of the most common ex-
change media has larger variation than income calculated as needs satisfac-
tion. Transaction costs grow considerably with economic growth due to high
specialization leading to longer supply chains. Equilibrium characteristics of
money values cannot properly be calculated as agents are on different roles
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in the value chain, but the average values show clear tendency to reach equi-
librium. The model is clearly well behaved and can be used to study detailed
effects of single variables. The software can contain programming mistakes,
but testing and cross checks have not revealed any serious inconsistency in
the results and there are no conceivable programming mistakes that could
produce the positive results. However, these are initial results only and ex-
tensive further study is required.
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